Egypt: Arrival of Omar Suleiman in presidential race is a double-edged sword

The juggernaut that is the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) appears to have been halted, at least temporarily, in what seemed its unstoppable journey to assume control of the two main centres of political power: the presidency and the parliament. They remain on course to achieve this goal but their previously irresistible progress has met a few obstacles.

Most critical is the suspension of the constituent assembly. The Brotherhood got greedy and tried to dominate the body. The courts have not given the reasons for their decision but the result is that there is a setback to the timetable.

The arrival in the presidential race of Omar Suleiman is a double-edged sword. He is a credible candidate of the old guard. He will appeal to those masses who feel that the economy and security have gone to the dogs. But he is also a useful whipping boy for the others.

One of the challenges for the Islamists is that they have defined themselves more by opposition to the old regime, by saying what they do not believe in, than by clearly articulating what they do stand for.

The two main candidates have something in common. Both operated in the shadows. And for all Khairat al-Shater's criticism of Omar Suleiman, the Brotherhood has a history. Indeed, in the early days of what has become known as the Egyptian revolution, Suleiman asked the opposition political parties to sit with him for a dialogue. All refused - except for the MB. The party is nothing if not pragmatic, but its double talk has eroded popular trust in its credibility.

For more news and expert analysis about Egypt, please see Egypt Politics & Security.

© 2012 Menas Associates

Egypt in turmoil

President Hosni Mubarak has dashed hopes and confounded dashed hopes and confounded expectations by using a televised address on State television last night to declare he would not budge. In effect, he said he was stepping aside, not down by handing over some unspecified powers to his newly appointed vice president and intelligence chief Omar Suleiman.

The move, or rather lack of one, came at the end of an extraordinary few hours. They began with the issuing of Communiqué Number One from the military command council. The communiqué itself was bland and uninformative:

“The Higher Army Council held a meeting today under Hussein Tantawi the head of the armed forces and minister of defence to discuss the necessary measures and preparations to protect the nation, its gains and the aspirations of the people. The council decided to remain in continuous session to discuss measures that can be taken in this regard.”

Historians of the Arab world, however, will recognise that the first intimation of a coup traditionally is the seizure of the radio station and the broadcast of a communiqué by a group of sometimes unknown army officers.

The army communiqué was followed by statements from the new secretary general of the ruling National Democratic Party Hossam Badrawi and the prime minister, Ahmed Shafiq, that President Mubarak was going.

The president's decision not to go but to soldier on until elections in September raises questions about the role of the army. There is no disputing that the protestors in Tahrir square feel deeply insulted by the patronising tone adopted by the incumbent president. Essentially, each side is now appealing to the armed forces to forgo its neutrality and take sides in this constitutional impasse. But it is yet unclear whether it will.

The army has now issued a Communiqué Number Two which "confirms the lifting of the state of emergency as soon as the current circumstances end," a pledge that would eradicate a 30-year law that protesters say is used to suppress dissent.

In an interview publicised shortly before the second communiqué, Egypt's leading opposition figure Mohamed El Baradei said the army "has to side with the people".

Speaking about the prospect of some of Mubarak's powers being transferred to Suleiman, El Baradei noted: “The people on the street feel the same way about Suleiman as they feel about Mubarak. He is to them only a mirror image of Mubarak."

We will, of course, keep you informed of any significant developments.

For more news and expert analysis about Egypt, please see Egypt Politics & Security.

© 2010 Menas Associates

Egypt: The presidential elections will likewise be an irrelevance

The parliamentary elections are over. We shall see in the next few days how Egypt's rulers digest the results. President Hosni Mubarak is due to make one of those key speeches that will indicate what changes he will make. Given his record, these will be changes in personnel rather than in direction.

Constitutionally, the elections also pre-qualify parties now able to put forward candidates for the presidential elections due next year. Article 76 of the constitution stipulates that only parties with representatives in parliament or the Shura Council may submit candidates for the presidency. The opposition parties won barely a handful of seats between them but one seat is enough. As a result, eight parties will be able to nominate presidential candidates.

Besides the National Democratic Party (NDP), they are the liberal Wafd Party, the leftist Tagammu Party, and the smaller Ghad, Geel, Nasserist, Al-Salam and Social Justice parties. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is not a party so cannot field a candidate. Two individuals often thought to be hopefuls — Mohamed El Baradei and Omar Suleiman — are in theory barred because they are not members of such parties.

What the parliamentary elections have shown, however, is that the Egyptian authorities have scant regard for legal niceties in the determination of who should be their rulers. The elections were marred by widespread fraud, despite the denials of leading party leaders. The presidential elections will likewise be an irrelevance. The system in Egypt will throw up the person who will succeed President Mubarak at the appropriate time. The people will not have a say. It was ever thus.

For more news and expert analysis about Egypt, please see Egypt Politics & Security.

© 2010 Menas Associates