Terror attacks continue in Kenya coastal counties

The security situation in coastal Kenya remains beyond state control. In the past two weeks, three further attacks have taken place. Attacks in Lamu and Tana River Counties, which have again been claimed by Somalia’s Al Shabaab militant Islamists, have resulted in the deaths of at least 22 people. The attacks took place on the night of Saturday 5 July.

The Tana River County attack was in the small town of Gamba, where detainees were freed from police cells and nine people were killed. At least a further 13 died at Hindi close to Mpeketoni in Lamu County. Al Shabaab claimed to have freed 40 detainees and to have killed 60 people in the process.

On the night of 11 July the village of Pandanguo was attacked by a gang of up to 60 people. Six police reservist guns were taken. Pandanguo is close to the village of Witu where, on the night of 22 June, another attack saw 11 people brutally killed.

Lamu County is fast turning into a war zone. People are fleeing the insecurity with at least 2,500 people being served by the Kenyan Red Cross in displaced people’s camps and many more relocating under their own resources. Some are reportedly questioning the government’s inept response which has allowed these attacks to continue.

The state’s response remains confused. Military spokesman Major Emmanuel Chirchir continues to contradict President Uhuru Kenyatta by pinning the blame for the attacks on Al Shabaab. Meanwhile, the Hindi and Tana River attacks have been blamed on the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC).

The MRC was founded in 1999 and seeks to establish an independent state based around Mombasa. It strongly denies the allegations. In a July 7 statement released on its Facebook page, they called on people “not to fall into the government’s trap of creating war between communities” and that “whether you like it or not, the Mombasa Republic will take its place amongst nations”. Prior to the Hindi and Gamba attacks the police reported the arrest of four alleged MRC members in Mombasa.

Mombasa itself remains tense. A Russian tourist was shot dead on Sunday 6 July while touring the UNESCO Heritage Site of Fort Jesus. It is unclear if the attack was a simple robbery or a terror attack that was targeting tourists.

On Friday 11 July the controversial businessman, Mohamed Shahid Butt, was assassinated in his car coming back from Mombasa’s Moi International airport. Butt was facing charges for inciting radicalism in the town and last appeared in court in December 2013. His shooting is suspected to have been carried out by state security officials in the Anti-Terror Police Unit. Similarly, the Al Shabaab-supporting cleric, Abubaker Shariff Ahmed, was murdered in April 2014.

The recent months have exposed the new frailties in Kenya. The traditional rivalries of the leadership of the country’s main tribes and their political groupings continue, but it is almost as a sideshow. Intensifying conflicts on the edges of the Kenyan state - in its arid north and its increasingly unstable if not ungovernable coastal region - present an increasingly acute risk to investors. The tourism sector is collapsing in the face of terror.

For more news and expert analysis about East Africa, please see East Africa Politics & Security.

© 2014 Menas Associates

IN DEPTH: Can Al-Maliki survive?

Despite his characteristic resilience, can Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki survive the unfolding crisis in Iraq? In the first week of the crisis Al-Maliki appeared lost and unable to comprehend the political ramifications of ISIS's advances and seemed to have been written off by almost every side. It therefore seemed all but inevitable that the beleaguered premier would have to concede defeat and step down.

In typical style, however, he pulled himself together quickly enough and since then has been on the offensive. Al-Maliki is fighting back hard, something that will have won him further support and respect among some Iraqi Shi’as, many of whom believe that, rather than being the root of the problem, Al-Maliki is the man to protect them from what they see as a sectarian onslaught by the Sunnis and by terrorist forces. 

One should not forget that Al-Maliki still has the support of large swathes of the Shi’a population. His State of Law Alliance took the largest number of votes in the last elections and Al-Maliki himself won 720,000 votes, the largest share of any single candidate. For all that he may be despised and accused of being authoritarian and sectarian, Al-Maliki is still the strongman of the Iraqi political scene. 

All this makes it very difficult for the other political players to force him out. This includes his Shi’a rivals. That is not to say that they haven’t been trying. The Sadrists and to a slightly lesser degree the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), are insisting on Al-Maliki’s departure, even going so far as to nominate alternative candidates for the premiership. At the end of June both blocs proposed Adel Abdulmehdi, the current deputy president, as their chosen candidate. 

Yet their efforts alone are unlikely to unseat Al-Maliki, who is not relying on either the Sadrists or ISCI for his third term. Aware that they were not going to give him a chance, he left both behind weeks ago, deciding instead to focus on forging alliances with other factions, including some Sunnis. It was through such alliances that Al-Maliki succeeded in getting the support of 165 MPs from a range of parties and currents outside the National Alliance. 

Thus for all that these big Shi’a players may be pushing for Al-Maliki’s departure they have little real influence over whether he stays or goes. 

Instead, Al-Maliki’s survival depends more on whether the State of Law Alliance and those smaller political forces that have thrown their weight behind him will continue to back him. There has been a lot of talk that key components inside the State of Law Alliance are ready to drop Al-Maliki. There have also been reports that the alliance is considering putting forward alternative candidates for the prime minister’s post. 

Among the names being circulated are Al-Maliki’s adviser Tariq Najm; deputy prime minister with responsibility for energy affairs Hussain Al-Shahrastani; deputy president Khodeir Khozei; transport minister and head of the Al-Badr Organisation, Hadi Al-Ameri; and national security adviser Faleh Al-Fayed. Notably, none of these individuals are from Al-Maliki’s Al-Dawa party, which had a weaker showing in the elections than many other components of the State of Law Alliance. 

Despite this talk, however, as yet there are no concrete signs that the alliance is about to crack or that it has any intention of withdrawing its support for Al-Maliki. This is perhaps unsurprising. State of Law is Al-Maliki’s creation and was built around him. Although there are other important figures within it, he is still the glue that holds it together and that enables it to attract so much public support. Thus abandoning Al-Maliki will not be that easy. That does not mean that they won’t do it. Much will depend on how much pressure the alliance comes under from other Shi’a parties, from other parts of the political establishment and from external forces, including Iran and the US – Washington clearly doesn’t want Al-Maliki to continue. 

As to whether those MPs from outside his alliance that Al-Maliki managed to win over will stick by him now this crisis has erupted, this is a more questionable matter. This is especially the case for those Sunni elements that Al-Maliki managed to pick off and bring over to his side, who may be persuaded to retract if they see that things are not going the prime minister’s way. Some of these elements might well falter if they see that the tide has turned against Al-Maliki and that the only way forward is to force him out of power. 

Al-Maliki’s days may well be numbered and without such support he will have no chance of holding on.

For more news and expert analysis about Iraq, please see Iraq Focus.

Yemen: Saudis put al-Huthi on list of terrorist organisations

Saudi Arabia issued a list of terrorist organisations on 6 March which includes the obvious suspects such as Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula but also al-Huthi and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). The Saudis have made clear that the banning of the MB is not directed at Islah, even though it is well known that the MB is part of that party. The naming of al-Huthi follows the approval of a new law on terrorism under which a special committee was set up to designate terrorist groups.

Riyadh has long regarded al-Huthi as hostile and fought al-Huthi fighters in 2009 and 2010. However, in the past three years the border has been quiet and both sides have avoided provocations. The Saudis have little doubt that al-Huthi is supported by Iran and the Lebanese Hizbollah and thus regarded as hostile. Riyadh will have been disturbed by the rapid rise in al- Huthi power in Yemen and the challenge this poses to some of Saudi Arabia’s traditional friends in the non-MB part of Islah. It is not clear if the al-Huthi political party, Ansar Allah, is affected.

Abd al-Malik al-Huthi blames the US, as usual, for the Saudi action, which he presented as taken precipitately and suggested that the Saudis might want to reconsider the situation. 

Saudi Arabia suspended its economic support to Yemen in late 2013, claiming that it wanted to encourage the politicians to agree on a way forward. The Saudi expulsion of Yemeni illegal migrants (within a general crackdown on illegals) has inflamed anti-Saudi opinion in Yemen.

Whether the Saudis have the will and capacity to turn the banning of al-Huthi into action against the movement in Yemen is moot.

Some Yemeni politicians are concerned about the rift within the GCC between Saudi Arabia and the UAE on one hand and Qatar on the other, mostly over Qatar’s backing for the MB. Qatar played a leading role in attempts in the late 2000s to mediate between the government and al-Huthi leaders and is the main financier, so far, of the fund to address southern grievances.

For more news and expert analysis about Yemen, please see Yemen Focus.

© 2014 Menas Associates