Short extension to Iran nuclear talks proposed as deadline looms

Iran and the P5+1 have been engaged in very intense negotiations since 2 July in a bid to achieve a comprehensive nuclear deal before the 20 July deadline. Though the deadline can be extended by up to six months, all parties involved are interested in finalising the deal soon.

The two sides agree that significant gaps remain, mainly on the issue of enrichment capacity. This translates into the number of centrifuges, production capacity, and stockpiles of enriched uranium. Various formulae could achieve the Western goal of prohibiting the breakout capability of the Iranian programme, defined as the point at which there is a sufficient quantity of highly enriched uranium to fuel a weapon.

Iran’s latest offer has included a freeze on enrichment to maintain the current capacity of about 9,000 centrifuges instead of reducing that now and allowing it to grow in the future. This suggestion is now being considered in Washington, but insiders there told Menas Associates that 9,000 spinning centrifuges would not offer enough leverage to President Obama to push back congressional pressure against sanctions relief.

It looks very likely that the two sides will agree on an extension of the talks by a few weeks, not by six months. That would allow them to close the gap between their positions, but there is also another important advantage: the US Congress will be on its summer break in August and if the comprehensive agreement is signed in mid-month, there will be no immediate congressional opposition.

Washington and Tehran have achieved their core objectives and are now attempting to make the deal more attractive to their domestic stakeholders. At the same time, each knows that it will be easy for the other to undo the progress made so far and return to the escalatory mode of the past few years.

A deal is thus likely in August and will then be implemented over the next two years, ultimately leading to a working relationship between Tehran and Washington and an improvement of ties between Iran and the European Union.

For more news and expert analysis about Iran, please see Iran Strategic Focus.

© 2014 Menas Associates

Pulling the plug on Bamako

Having been deprived of a large part of its multilateral budget aid following the 2012 coup, things were looking rosy for the Mali government by January of this year as international donors, including the World Bank, European Union, and the African Development Bank (AfDB), committed US$4.4 billion to support the economic and social recovery of the country.

So far over the past year, Mali has received US$300 million of the approximately US$900 million allocated by the World Bank’s assistance programme. Over the past months, however, it has seemed only a matter of time before the international community, especially those parts holding the purse strings, lost patience with the incompetent and corrupt Bamako government. That has now happened.

The last straw for international donors was the purchase in May of a presidential jet for Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (IBK) from a private company without any tender. In addition to the improper purchasing process, it now transpires that not all of the money paid for the plane finished up in the hands of the supplier.

Similar corruption allegations also surround questionable arms contracts made by the IBK coterie. As a consequence, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has suspended aid to Mali until September. The World Bank followed suit by postponing the payment of US$63 million in budgetary support. Managing director Sri Mulyani Indrawati announced the decision on 25 June.

An estimated €100 million from the European Union has also been frozen until further notice, and it is expected that major foreign donors will now suspend payments. Important donor partners include France, Germany, the United States, Canada, Holland, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. A review of the management of Mali’s public finances is also underway.

These decisions are a severe punishment and big blow to the Bamako government, but they are not all surprising. The question is how deeply they will affect negotiations over the future of Azawad.

These financial blows, alongside the defeat of the Malian army in May, have not only strengthened the negotiating hand of the Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) but have shifted international opinion towards the realisation that some form of federalism is the only solution.

Dialogue better than war

Mali’s president and prime minster are going through a painful learning process. Interviews in the international media with IBK and Prime Minister Moussa Marra at the end of June suggest that both men now prefer dialogue to war.

From the tone of the interviews, it is clear that they have been chastened by the Malian army’s humiliating performance in Kidal, the increasing frustration of the United Nations with the government’s failure to make progress in the peace process, and the decisions of the international donor community to suspend funds.

These events have perhaps served the purpose of making the political class realise that if the government does not enter into serious and well-meaning negotiations with the rebel Azawad groups very soon, Bamako’s future could become extremely grim.

For more news and expert analysis about the Sahara region, please see Sahara Focus.

  

© 2014 Menas Associates

Mali: peace process loses momentum

It is clear from the array of reports and commentaries over the last month that the Mali peace process has lost momentum, if it ever had any.

The Ouagadougou Agreement of 18 June 2013 stipulated that an ‘inclusive dialogue’ should begin 60 days after the naming of a new government. That has not happened. Since then, the Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) and the government have accused each other of reneging on agreements on security arrangements in Kidal.

There are two fundamental reasons.

First, the Bamako government has rarely shown much interest in its extreme northeast (Kidal), let alone most of its north (Azawad). It has never had more than a fleeting political or economic inclination to get to grips with the extremely taxing and deep-rooted problems of the region, and looks even less likely to do so today than it did this time last year.

Second, much blame must be placed on that vast, enigmatic entity, the ‘international community.’ It embraces the United Nations (and all its many agencies), the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States, the European Union, a host of NGOs, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and many other largely unaccountable entities, including NATO – not to mention the plethora of so-called experts, many of whom have little more than a passing acquaintance with the region or its people.

A month or so ago, most analysts recognised that the northern region of Kidal remained an MNLA stronghold. Also in the area are the French army, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, and troops of the Mali army. But they are not enough to secure the vast area. 

Many politicians and commentators in Bamako have been arguing that the French army should step aside and let a strengthened Mali army step in. But in 2013, the MNLA warned one reporter that ‘to plant a Malian flag in Kidal is an act of war.’

That remains pretty much the case today, except for one thing. The MNLA itself is now fragmenting into what appear to be at least three parties. While this may be a temporary state of affairs, it makes any sort of overall deal almost impossible in the near future.

For more news and expert analysis about the Sahara region, please see Sahara Focus.

© 2014 Menas Associates