Pulling the plug on Bamako

Having been deprived of a large part of its multilateral budget aid following the 2012 coup, things were looking rosy for the Mali government by January of this year as international donors, including the World Bank, European Union, and the African Development Bank (AfDB), committed US$4.4 billion to support the economic and social recovery of the country.

So far over the past year, Mali has received US$300 million of the approximately US$900 million allocated by the World Bank’s assistance programme. Over the past months, however, it has seemed only a matter of time before the international community, especially those parts holding the purse strings, lost patience with the incompetent and corrupt Bamako government. That has now happened.

The last straw for international donors was the purchase in May of a presidential jet for Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (IBK) from a private company without any tender. In addition to the improper purchasing process, it now transpires that not all of the money paid for the plane finished up in the hands of the supplier.

Similar corruption allegations also surround questionable arms contracts made by the IBK coterie. As a consequence, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has suspended aid to Mali until September. The World Bank followed suit by postponing the payment of US$63 million in budgetary support. Managing director Sri Mulyani Indrawati announced the decision on 25 June.

An estimated €100 million from the European Union has also been frozen until further notice, and it is expected that major foreign donors will now suspend payments. Important donor partners include France, Germany, the United States, Canada, Holland, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. A review of the management of Mali’s public finances is also underway.

These decisions are a severe punishment and big blow to the Bamako government, but they are not all surprising. The question is how deeply they will affect negotiations over the future of Azawad.

These financial blows, alongside the defeat of the Malian army in May, have not only strengthened the negotiating hand of the Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) but have shifted international opinion towards the realisation that some form of federalism is the only solution.

Dialogue better than war

Mali’s president and prime minster are going through a painful learning process. Interviews in the international media with IBK and Prime Minister Moussa Marra at the end of June suggest that both men now prefer dialogue to war.

From the tone of the interviews, it is clear that they have been chastened by the Malian army’s humiliating performance in Kidal, the increasing frustration of the United Nations with the government’s failure to make progress in the peace process, and the decisions of the international donor community to suspend funds.

These events have perhaps served the purpose of making the political class realise that if the government does not enter into serious and well-meaning negotiations with the rebel Azawad groups very soon, Bamako’s future could become extremely grim.

For more news and expert analysis about the Sahara region, please see Sahara Focus.

  

© 2014 Menas Associates

Mali: peace process loses momentum

It is clear from the array of reports and commentaries over the last month that the Mali peace process has lost momentum, if it ever had any.

The Ouagadougou Agreement of 18 June 2013 stipulated that an ‘inclusive dialogue’ should begin 60 days after the naming of a new government. That has not happened. Since then, the Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) and the government have accused each other of reneging on agreements on security arrangements in Kidal.

There are two fundamental reasons.

First, the Bamako government has rarely shown much interest in its extreme northeast (Kidal), let alone most of its north (Azawad). It has never had more than a fleeting political or economic inclination to get to grips with the extremely taxing and deep-rooted problems of the region, and looks even less likely to do so today than it did this time last year.

Second, much blame must be placed on that vast, enigmatic entity, the ‘international community.’ It embraces the United Nations (and all its many agencies), the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States, the European Union, a host of NGOs, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and many other largely unaccountable entities, including NATO – not to mention the plethora of so-called experts, many of whom have little more than a passing acquaintance with the region or its people.

A month or so ago, most analysts recognised that the northern region of Kidal remained an MNLA stronghold. Also in the area are the French army, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, and troops of the Mali army. But they are not enough to secure the vast area. 

Many politicians and commentators in Bamako have been arguing that the French army should step aside and let a strengthened Mali army step in. But in 2013, the MNLA warned one reporter that ‘to plant a Malian flag in Kidal is an act of war.’

That remains pretty much the case today, except for one thing. The MNLA itself is now fragmenting into what appear to be at least three parties. While this may be a temporary state of affairs, it makes any sort of overall deal almost impossible in the near future.

For more news and expert analysis about the Sahara region, please see Sahara Focus.

© 2014 Menas Associates

Jeremy Kennan on 5Live Radio

Our Algeria expert Jeremy Kennan speaks to Shelagh Fogarty about the kidnapping of BP oil workers. Please follow the link to hear the interview:


http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b01pw4rs


From 1:26 minutes onward.

For more news and expert analysis about Algeria, please see Algeria Focus and Algeria Politics & Security.



 

Algerian troops in Mali

The linkage of the alleged Aguelhok executions to Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the DRS raises two significant questions:

What was the Algerian army doing in Aguelhok?
Was the West complicit?
Troops on the move

Algerian armed forces crossed into Mali on 20 December. While the Algerian government eventually admitted that 15 military instructors had been sent to Mali, local observers reported an Algerian army convoy of five army trucks with trailers and 24 heavily armed 4x4s heading south on the Bordj Mokhtar–Tessalit– Aguelhok road. The number of troops was not given but can be assumed at around 200.

The same sources confirmed Algerian troops were garrisoned at the army bases in both Tessalit and Aguelhok. In addition, an army transport was seen flying into Kidal. It contained an unspecified number of Algerian army officers and was reportedly heavily armed. What were these troops doing in Aguelhok and had they been withdrawn to Algeria by the time of the alleged executions? The official reason given by Algeria for its troop presence was to help Mali combat AQIM. That was untrue, however, as no attacks have been launched at any time against AQIM in Mali by either Malian or Algerian forces.

All the signs are that the Algerian army wasn't here to protect AQIM from any assault on it by the MNLA, which has threatened to rid Mali of AQIM. As the MNLA has stated, AQIM is a cover for the billion-dollar cocaine trafficking industry, which is controlled by elements of the political-military elites and their security services in both Mali and Algeria. While the MNLA's secessionist demands may be a threat to Mali's sovereignty, the most serious threat is to the continued presence of AQIM in Mali and the lucrative state-run cocaine business. Indeed, if Mali were not such a close client state of Washington, it is likely that it would already have been labelled a narco-state.

Western complicity?

The second question concerns the matter of complicity. The line of reasoning is as follows. If Abdelhamid Abou Zaïd and AQIM were involved in executions at Aguelhok, the DRS is implicated and its allies and backers, namely the United States and the United Kingdom, may also be deemed complicit. Both US and UK intelligence services are aware of the DRSled AQIM training camp in the Tassili-n-Ajjer. Thus, if Malian soldiers were executed at Aguelhok by AQIM, the people who undertook the executions were under or closely associated with Abou Zaïd's command and almost certainly trained in such methods at the DRS-managed AQIM training camp. If an international enquiry were to establish such a chain, then how far could Western allies of the DRS be held accountable? That question makes a full investigation of what took place at Aguelhok unlikely.

For more news and expert analysis about the Sahara region, please see Sahara Focus.

© 2012 Menas Associates

Algeria: Over 25,000 candidates to contest the 10 May elections

While events in neighbouring Mali are dominating the local press, the Algerian election is now less than six weeks away and, although there is little genuine interest, getting a respectable turnout remains the governments' principal concern. According to data released by the Interior Ministry at the end of this week, which we have not been able to verify, around 25,800 candidates will contest the 462 parliamentary seats in the 10 May 10 legislative elections.

The ministry issued a statement saying that 2,053 lists of candidates had been received by 26 March which was the deadline for the submission of lists. According to the statement, 1,842 lists covered 44 political parties of which 21 were new parties approved and registered in January. The remaining 211 lists were for independent candidates.

A total of 7,646 of the 25,800 candidates are female which means that the female-male gender split of candidates is 30.18% and 69.82% respectively.

The lists will now be examined by those in charge of the election (i.e. the government) until 10 April. The rejected lists can appeal before the Administrative Court before 14 April with the election campaign officially beginning on April 15.

For more news and expert analysis about Algeria, please see Algeria Focus and Algeria Politics & Security.

© 2012 Menas Associates