Pulling the plug on Bamako

Having been deprived of a large part of its multilateral budget aid following the 2012 coup, things were looking rosy for the Mali government by January of this year as international donors, including the World Bank, European Union, and the African Development Bank (AfDB), committed US$4.4 billion to support the economic and social recovery of the country.

So far over the past year, Mali has received US$300 million of the approximately US$900 million allocated by the World Bank’s assistance programme. Over the past months, however, it has seemed only a matter of time before the international community, especially those parts holding the purse strings, lost patience with the incompetent and corrupt Bamako government. That has now happened.

The last straw for international donors was the purchase in May of a presidential jet for Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (IBK) from a private company without any tender. In addition to the improper purchasing process, it now transpires that not all of the money paid for the plane finished up in the hands of the supplier.

Similar corruption allegations also surround questionable arms contracts made by the IBK coterie. As a consequence, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has suspended aid to Mali until September. The World Bank followed suit by postponing the payment of US$63 million in budgetary support. Managing director Sri Mulyani Indrawati announced the decision on 25 June.

An estimated €100 million from the European Union has also been frozen until further notice, and it is expected that major foreign donors will now suspend payments. Important donor partners include France, Germany, the United States, Canada, Holland, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. A review of the management of Mali’s public finances is also underway.

These decisions are a severe punishment and big blow to the Bamako government, but they are not all surprising. The question is how deeply they will affect negotiations over the future of Azawad.

These financial blows, alongside the defeat of the Malian army in May, have not only strengthened the negotiating hand of the Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) but have shifted international opinion towards the realisation that some form of federalism is the only solution.

Dialogue better than war

Mali’s president and prime minster are going through a painful learning process. Interviews in the international media with IBK and Prime Minister Moussa Marra at the end of June suggest that both men now prefer dialogue to war.

From the tone of the interviews, it is clear that they have been chastened by the Malian army’s humiliating performance in Kidal, the increasing frustration of the United Nations with the government’s failure to make progress in the peace process, and the decisions of the international donor community to suspend funds.

These events have perhaps served the purpose of making the political class realise that if the government does not enter into serious and well-meaning negotiations with the rebel Azawad groups very soon, Bamako’s future could become extremely grim.

For more news and expert analysis about the Sahara region, please see Sahara Focus.

  

© 2014 Menas Associates

Upcoming Mauritania presidential elections

Mauritanians go to the polls on 21 June to elect a new President. The incumbent, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, launched his re-election campaign on 6 June in the southern city of Kaedi, telling supporters that since he came to power the country had made ‘great strides’ in security and economic growth.

Abdel Aziz has the strong support of the West, notably the United States, France, and the UK, for his tough stance against terrorism. Also, at face value his economic claims are hard to dispute. Mauritania managed economic growth of 6 per cent last year, with the president claiming credit for the burgeoning mining sector and a drop in inflation to less than 5 per cent.

He has also brought a degree of stability and continuity, thereby reassuring international companies that have invested in the country.

Poverty is still widespread, however, and unless the country strikes oil and/or gas in good quantities fairly soon, its economic future is in the balance. 

The more radical opposition parties have formed themselves into a new alliance called the National Forum for Democracy and Unity (FNDU). They comprise the Islamist Tawassoul movement and the 10 opposition parties forming the Coordination for a Democratic Opposition (COD), which boycotted last November’s election.

The FNDU is boycotting the upcoming election because its members claim that the process lacks credibility and transparency. Other opposition parties, notably the Popular Progressive Alliance (APP), are also boycotting the election for the same reason.

The opposition parties have widely criticised Abdel Aziz for his authoritarian rule. Thousands of FNDU supporters demonstrated throughout Nouakchott on 3 June, protesting at his autocratic approach and at the way the elections have been organised.

His opponents claim, with good reason, that democracy has taken a backseat during his tenure. They accuse the president of using the government and state institutions as his own personal electoral apparatus. This month, six ministers went on vacation, reportedly ordered to do so in order to spend time helping to manage the president’s electoral campaign. Among them were the minister of justice and the government’s official spokesperson. 

Abdel Aziz’s response to the election boycott has been a defiant call for a 100 per cent turnout. The opposition, in turn, has vowed to ramp up its protests.

For more news and expert analysis about the Sahara region, please see Sahara Focus.

  

© 2014 Menas Associates

Sahara: IEA on North Africa

 

The International Energy Agency (IEA) medium-term outlook report, published on 28 May, anticipates that oil production from OPEC members Algeria, Angola, Libya, and Nigeria will stagnate over the next five years at 7.12 million b/d, posting more or less zero growth from 2012 to 2018. Last year, the agency anticipated supply growth of 685,000 b/d from 2011 to 2017.

 

Antoine Halff , head of markets at the IEA in Paris, said that at first the Arab Spring of 2011 looked like a blip as production recovered quickly from the war in Libya. 'But it turns out it is a big event,' he said. 'We are beginning to see security issues in northern and western Africa and this will have implications for OPEC supply.' Although oil production recovered from the Arab Spring faster than expected, the delayed impact of the revolutions that swept across North Africa is now hurting supply growth forecasts for Libya, Algeria, and Nigeria.

 

The IEA is particularly bearish about Algeria, forecasting a drop in oil production capacity from last year's 1.2 million b/d to 0.8 million b/d by 2018. The other African members of OPEC will see their production capacity stagnate instead of posting significant growth, as the IEA forecast only a year ago. This gloomy outlook comes on the back of escalating security risks, uncompetitive fiscal terms, challenging local content requirements, and contract sanctity concerns. The IEA concludes, 'Increased violence by Islamist extremists and militants, against a backdrop of political instability across much of northern and western Africa since the Arab spring, is changing the equation for acceptable risks for international oil companies.'

 

For more news and expert analysis about the Sahara region, please see Sahara Focus.

© 2013 Menas Associates

Latest news about French hostages and the Political repercussions in Algeria

The latest news on the situation from France's senior military officer, Admiral Edouard Guillaud, (via AFP) is that “France has no plans to use force to rescue [the] five hostages held in the Sahara by al-Qa'ida and wants to negotiate with the militant group.

“Military intervention is not, at the moment I am speaking to you, on the agenda," he told Europe 1 radio. "Of course, French authorities are ready to make contact at any moment, the only problem we have is that, as is usual in this kind of matter, it is the hostage takers who control the timetable," he said.

On 23rd September, French Defence Minister Hervé Morin revealed that France was attempting to get in touch with al-Qa'ida to discover if they have any ransom demands following the hostage taking.

Such incidents can have unforeseen consequences. One relates to the long-running 'story' of the 'secret US base' at Tamanrasset, built by Halliburton's corrupt and now closed subsidiary Brown Root Condor Spa (BRC). The 'story', first documented around 2003, that the US had acquired secret basing rights in Algeria's extreme south, has never gained much traction within Algeria itself. That is largely because the story has been raised mostly in international and predominantly English-language media.

However, on Friday (24th September) the Algerian daily El Watan, picking up on this story in France's Le Canard Enchaîné (CE), revealed to the Algerian public that 400 US troops were stationed at a US secret base [outside Tamanrasset] in Algeria's extreme south. Such a story, if true, would be political dynamite. Coming from Algeria's most respected daily, the story, now finally drawn to the attention of the Algerian public, appears to be causing political ructions.

How and why El Watan published the story is intriguing, and says much for the dangers of both the US and Algeria never having told the whole truth about the base. Hence, rumours and false information flourish. El Watan's figure of 400 US troops comes from an unverified media report from 2003 or thereabouts, which has been regurgitated on an almost annual basis. (Journalists rarely check their sources!). Certainly, it is true that the base does exist, with building having begun around the year 2000, and that the US has used it at various times.

In spite of denials, there is a secret agreement between the US and Algeria which grants the US certain user rights, etc. At one time, about 400 US forces were in the region, with many of them being based temporarily at the base or transiting through it. It is also almost certainly true that a small number of US personnel are based there more or less permanently to man electronic listening and surveillance equipment.

El Watan , we believe, took the story from CE, which in turn dug up the figure of 400US troops from its archives and added them to a Special Report written earlier this week by UPI and published in several media on 23rd September. The very speculative UPI report states: “It is from there [the Tamanrasset base] that the French surveillance aircraft hunting the jihadists and their captives are probably operating.” That may be correct, although most reports have the French air search operating out of Niamey.

This story, of questionable accuracy, looks as if it might finally gain traction within Algeria and thus add to President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's internal political problems, as the way the El Watan story is running suggests that he was the key architect in granting this 'secret facility' to the Americans. In the last 24 hours, the story has received wide coverage through Al Jazeera (Arabic) and possibly other Arab-language channels.

For more news and expert analysis about Algeria please see Algeria Focus and Algeria Politics & Security.

For more news and expert analysis about the Sahara region, please see Sahara Focus.

© 2010 Menas Associates