Yemen: Saudis put al-Huthi on list of terrorist organisations

Saudi Arabia issued a list of terrorist organisations on 6 March which includes the obvious suspects such as Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula but also al-Huthi and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). The Saudis have made clear that the banning of the MB is not directed at Islah, even though it is well known that the MB is part of that party. The naming of al-Huthi follows the approval of a new law on terrorism under which a special committee was set up to designate terrorist groups.

Riyadh has long regarded al-Huthi as hostile and fought al-Huthi fighters in 2009 and 2010. However, in the past three years the border has been quiet and both sides have avoided provocations. The Saudis have little doubt that al-Huthi is supported by Iran and the Lebanese Hizbollah and thus regarded as hostile. Riyadh will have been disturbed by the rapid rise in al- Huthi power in Yemen and the challenge this poses to some of Saudi Arabia’s traditional friends in the non-MB part of Islah. It is not clear if the al-Huthi political party, Ansar Allah, is affected.

Abd al-Malik al-Huthi blames the US, as usual, for the Saudi action, which he presented as taken precipitately and suggested that the Saudis might want to reconsider the situation. 

Saudi Arabia suspended its economic support to Yemen in late 2013, claiming that it wanted to encourage the politicians to agree on a way forward. The Saudi expulsion of Yemeni illegal migrants (within a general crackdown on illegals) has inflamed anti-Saudi opinion in Yemen.

Whether the Saudis have the will and capacity to turn the banning of al-Huthi into action against the movement in Yemen is moot.

Some Yemeni politicians are concerned about the rift within the GCC between Saudi Arabia and the UAE on one hand and Qatar on the other, mostly over Qatar’s backing for the MB. Qatar played a leading role in attempts in the late 2000s to mediate between the government and al-Huthi leaders and is the main financier, so far, of the fund to address southern grievances.

For more news and expert analysis about Yemen, please see Yemen Focus.

© 2014 Menas Associates

Yemen: A plague of kidnappings

On 10 January, Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula released Yolande Korkie, a South African it had held since May 2013, but only to facilitate demands for a ransom of $3 million for her husband, Pierre. Both are teachers working with a South African charity, Gift for Givers Foundation, which had been in touch with the kidnappers for some time to try to arrange their release.

Korkie explained that they had failed to persuade the kidnappers that their families were too poor to pay such a sum. AQAP suggested they ask Qatar or another government to intervene, perhaps hoping for a repeat of the part played by Oman in arranging freedom for two Finns and an Austrian last year (for what was said to be a very large ransom).

Gift of the Givers was given three weeks to come up with the money but said in early February that it had lost contact with the kidnappers shortly before the deadline expired, though it later received assurances that Pierre was alive and would not be executed. The couple had been in Yemen for four years and must have been aware of the risks they were running.

The UN Security Council has again called in governments and other organisations not to agree to ransom demands from kidnappers as the money is used to finance terrorism and encourages the further use of this form of extortion.

A German in his 60s studying Arabic was taken in central Sana’a on 31 January but apparently by tribesmen from Marib in dispute with the government. He should eventually be released unless the kidnappers sell him on to AQAP. A British oil worker was kidnapped on 3 February along with two Yemenis outside a supermarket at Hadda in Sana’a. Nothing is known of the motive, nor has there been any news.

An Iranian commercial attaché was killed in early January as he was leaving the residence of the Iranian ambassador in what appeared to be a bungled kidnap attempt. Another Iranian diplomat taken several months ago is still being held but the Tehran government says that he is in good health – contrary to reports that his body had been found in Marib. AQAP is also still holding the Saudi consul in Aden and there may be at least one other western hostage whose name (and even news of his kidnapping) has not been made public.

For more news and expert analysis about Yemen, please see Yemen Focus.

© 2014 Menas Associates

Yemen: AQAP attacks US embassy vehicle

Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is suspected of being ultimately responsible for an attack on a car used by members of the US embassy on their way to or from a restaurant in the diplomatic area. Media reports say a Jordanian, who was arrested at the scene, had exploded a satchel or grenade under the car (which was armoured). No Americans were injured.

The Jordanian had false identity documents and weapons in his vehicle. This was a timely reminder — not that Western residents need one – of the risks even in Sana'a. Earlier in 2010 there were attacks on the British ambassador and then the charge d'affaires. The AQAP attackers have not been arrested (though the first attack was by a suicide bomber).

There was a hit-and-run attack against a soldier in Abyan by a terrorist using a motorbike. This is the 28th such attack in the past few months and comes after efforts to place restrictions on the use of motorbikes. AQAP appears to have been responsible for an attack near Zingibar in Abyan, leading to the death of two soldiers manning a checkpoint, and a failed attack on a senior security officer in Abyan. He was on a list of targets AQAP distributed in September.

For more news and expert analysis about Yemen, please see Yemen Focus.

© 2010 Menas Associates

Saudi policy towards Yemen

The prominent role of Saudi Arabia at the New York meeting of the Friends of Yemen and its hosting of the next one show that Riyadh is giving a much higher priority to dealing with Yemen 's problems. Until recently, western and regional governments have been privately concerned over a perceived lack of clarity in the Saudi strategy and who might be directing it. There has, at times, been a degree of mutual suspicion about the real ambitions in Yemen of Saudi Arabia and its Western allies.

Saudi policy was much clearer before the border agreement of 2000 when it was firmly in the hands of Prince Sultan bin Abdel-Aziz , the defence minister. In those days Saudi strategy sought to keep the Yemeni regime strong enough to survive but not powerful enough to impose its control on the major tribes or pose a threat to Saudi Arabia. Many tribal leaders received and still get subsidies from Prince Sultan's office. Saudi Arabia opposed Yemeni unity in 1990 and openly supported the southerners when they attempted to secede in 1994.

Since the 2000 border agreement and the rise of Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula Prince Nayif, the minister of interior, has taken the most prominent role with his son Prince Muhammad visiting Sana'a regularly and offering to aid its fight against AQAP. More recently, Prince Abd al-Aziz , a son of King Abdullah , has had a new and unspecified role in Saudi policy-making on Yemen.

The problems on the border with the Huthi in late 2009 and early 2010 brought the defence ministry clearly back into the act with Prince Khalid bin Sultan, the assistant minister, directing the Saudi campaign to clear the border area of Huthi fighters. It is never easy in Saudi Arabia to ensure coordination between the large entities controlled by senior princes. Saudi Arabia has not yet developed the capacity to project its political and diplomatic power consistently and prefers, where possible, to use its cheque book. Saudi officials also seemed to be uncomfortable with the assertion made by Western officials that Saudi Arabia should take the lead in dealing with Yemen.

However, there is clearly a new urgency in the Saudi attitude, indicating that there has been a review of strategy and an effort to co-ordinate the work of its agencies. Saudi leaders state publicly that they want stability in Yemen. They dread the opportunities a chaotic and unstable Yemen might offer to AQAP and both Sunni and Zaydi extremists. They are concerned about the possibility that Iran and other potential Saudi rivals might seek to exploit the chaos to damage Saudi Arabia. There is thus a greater willingness to work with regional and international partners within the framework of the Friends of Yemen, in which Saudi Arabia can play an influential role and share the burden of leadership and costs with others.

For more news and expert analysis about Yemen, please see Yemen Focus.

© 2010 Menas Associates