Pulling the plug on Bamako

Having been deprived of a large part of its multilateral budget aid following the 2012 coup, things were looking rosy for the Mali government by January of this year as international donors, including the World Bank, European Union, and the African Development Bank (AfDB), committed US$4.4 billion to support the economic and social recovery of the country.

So far over the past year, Mali has received US$300 million of the approximately US$900 million allocated by the World Bank’s assistance programme. Over the past months, however, it has seemed only a matter of time before the international community, especially those parts holding the purse strings, lost patience with the incompetent and corrupt Bamako government. That has now happened.

The last straw for international donors was the purchase in May of a presidential jet for Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (IBK) from a private company without any tender. In addition to the improper purchasing process, it now transpires that not all of the money paid for the plane finished up in the hands of the supplier.

Similar corruption allegations also surround questionable arms contracts made by the IBK coterie. As a consequence, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has suspended aid to Mali until September. The World Bank followed suit by postponing the payment of US$63 million in budgetary support. Managing director Sri Mulyani Indrawati announced the decision on 25 June.

An estimated €100 million from the European Union has also been frozen until further notice, and it is expected that major foreign donors will now suspend payments. Important donor partners include France, Germany, the United States, Canada, Holland, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. A review of the management of Mali’s public finances is also underway.

These decisions are a severe punishment and big blow to the Bamako government, but they are not all surprising. The question is how deeply they will affect negotiations over the future of Azawad.

These financial blows, alongside the defeat of the Malian army in May, have not only strengthened the negotiating hand of the Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) but have shifted international opinion towards the realisation that some form of federalism is the only solution.

Dialogue better than war

Mali’s president and prime minster are going through a painful learning process. Interviews in the international media with IBK and Prime Minister Moussa Marra at the end of June suggest that both men now prefer dialogue to war.

From the tone of the interviews, it is clear that they have been chastened by the Malian army’s humiliating performance in Kidal, the increasing frustration of the United Nations with the government’s failure to make progress in the peace process, and the decisions of the international donor community to suspend funds.

These events have perhaps served the purpose of making the political class realise that if the government does not enter into serious and well-meaning negotiations with the rebel Azawad groups very soon, Bamako’s future could become extremely grim.

For more news and expert analysis about the Sahara region, please see Sahara Focus.

  

© 2014 Menas Associates

New Saharan provinces in Mali

On 16th December, the Malian government announced that it was going ahead with the plan to create two new provinces in the northern desert regions of Taoudéni and Ménaka. Taoudéni is currently part of the Timbuktu region and Ménaka part of Gao.

This move is in accordance with the intention to increase the number of provinces from eight to 19 over five years. While justified as part of the state's decentralisation programme, the creation of these two new provinces in particular is also an attempt to improve the security of the country's northern region. The move will inject more administration into these largely ignored regions, as well as new military commands.

While the proposal appears to be welcomed by some sectors of the population, notably the Arab community of Timbuktu, it is receiving mixed initial views from the Tuareg population. While some see it as a genuine move towards decentralisation, others are wary that it will establish greater restrictions, especially militarily, over the predominantly Tuareg regions. The schedule for these new regions coming into practice is not yet established.

For more news and expert analysis about the Sahara region, please see Sahara Focus.

© 2012 Menas Associates

Qadhafi forces continue to fight against resurgent rebels

Despite the speed with which matters seem to have moved in the last few weeks, elements from the Qadhafi regime continue to fight against the resurgent rebels. Loyalists are still fighting in parts of Tripoli and in the Qadhafi strongholds of Sirte and Sebha, which remain loyal to the regime. Pro-Qadhafi control is so strong in Sirte that rebel leaders have attempted to negotiate with the town rather than launch an all-out attack.

The whereabouts of Qadhafi is still a matter for debate. On 27th August, Associated Press announced that it had received a telephone call from his spokesman Musa Ibrahim. He claimed to have seen “Brother Leader” on 26th August, and said that he was carrying an offer from the Colonel to negotiate with the rebel leadership over a transitional government. The National Transitional Council (NTC) representatives have shown no interest in this overture.

The NTC has offered a reward of US$1,300,000 for anyone capturing Qadhafi. An amnesty has also been offered to anyone, including his supporters, who kills or detains the Leader.

Current speculations on Qadhafi's whereabouts are as follows:

There is a possibility that he is still in Tripoli, perhaps having utilised the many underground passages underneath his Bab al-Azizya compound
There is also a chance that Qadhafi has been in Sirte, or more likely in Sebha, for some time and is, together with his sons, directing resistance from there.
The latest rumour put forward by a former head of the special forces, Adbel Salam al-Hasi, was that the Leader has taken up a role with his Tuareg followers in the south western desert region of Fezzan, near the Algerian border.

For more news and expert analysis about Libya, please see Libya Focus and Libya Politics & Security.

© 2011 Menas Associates

The murder of Merzouk

Around 4:00 a.m. on 12th August, a Tuareg known as Merzouk, whose proper name was Sidi Mohamed ag Chérif, was executed by kidnappers, believed to be members of AQIM, in the Tigharghar mountains of northeastern Mali. Media speculation focused on two assumed motives. One is that it was revenge for his involvement in an attack on the (GSPC)/AQIM emir Mokhtar ben Mokhtar (MBM) in 2006 in which Mokhtar's right-hand man was killed. The other is that he was found to be carrying documents from an unspecified Western embassy in Bamako and was therefore presumably a spy.

The most authoritative account is given on the local Kidal.info website. From this account, it is evident that Merzouk had led a chequered and dangerous life as a Tuareg rebel, a guide to the Malian customs service (with the rank of lieutenant), and an agent for Mali's state security service. He also had a long history of association with MBM, the GSPC, and AQIM. However, one thing not mentioned is that Merzouk, according to another reliable local source, was in regular communication with the US embassy in Bamako. It is therefore possible that he was perceived by AQIM as a spy for the infidel.

Kidal.info mentions that shortly before Merzouk was kidnapped and assassinated, a young friend of his had been captured in Tigharghar by AQIM on suspicion of spying for Merzouk. This tallies with information from Menas sources in the region, namely that Merzouk had given one of his 'cousins' (i.e., close relations) a motorbike and satellite phone and sent him into Tigharghar to get information for him.

The young man's captors ordered him to call Merzouk and to arrange to meet him, whereupon he was kidnapped and then killed. It is therefore quite conceivable that Merzouk was killed by AQIM both for spying on them and for having identified and tracked down several of their members for crimes, such as theft, committed in Mali. However, informed opinion within Algeria is suggesting that his death may have been ordered by the DRS, either because Merzouk, like Lamana Ould Bou before him, had discovered its role in AQIM or as a warning to the Americans that if they want information on the region and AQIM, they must approach the DRS and not try to operate independently.

For more news and expert analysis about the Sahara region, please see Sahara Focus.

Seven kidnapped by 'local bandits' in Arlit, northern Niger

Seven foreigners, including five French nationals, were kidnapped in the uranium mining town of Arlit in northern Niger in the small hours of Thursday 16th September. The identities of those abducted and the precise circumstances of their abduction are still not clear. Fuller details will be given in Menas Associates' forthcoming issue of Sahara Focus.

Niger is the world's fourth largest uranium producer, with most of its uranium coming from two mines owned by French nuclear company Areva, and located close to the town of Arlit.

All seven abducted were employees of either Areva, or the construction company Sogea-Satom, which is a subsidiary of Vinci, that was reportedly undertaking certain earth-moving operations for Areva. Five of those abducted were French nationals; the other two were from Madagascar and Togo.

Two of the French nationals are a husband and wife. The husband is an employee of Areva. It is not clear whether the wife is also an employee of Areva, as reported in some media, or merely accompanying her husband. According to information from Areva, it appears that only the husband is actually their employee. The other three French nationals are reported to be working for Vinci, as are the two from Madagascar and Togo.

Although this incident took place outside Algeria's national borders, and is not only part of the Algerian 'security complex', we have good reason to believe that its operation is likely to be known to Algeria's intelligence service, which has long had a high presence in the region.

We have been receiving information from our sources in the region throughout most of Thursday 16th. Although we do not know the identities of the kidnappers, we can pass on the following information, but we do emphasise that this information should be regarded as no more than well informed local opinion.

Given:

> the high level of political insecurity in this region as a result of the recent Tuareg rebellion and its fragmentation into a number of rebel movements

> the presence of AQIM

> the rapidly escalating level of banditry (and 'criminality')

> the collapse of traditional livelihoods since 2003, notably those associated with the tourism industry

> the provocative actions of Algerian DRS elements; and

> the escalation of drug trafficking across the region - local opinion is that the kidnappers could be 'almost anyone'.

No one has yet claimed responsibility. Eye witness accounts, cited by Niger government spokesman Laouali Dan Dahdit, said that up to 30 people, speaking Arabic and Tamasheq (the local Tuareg Berber dialect), were involved. Niger security sources confirm that there was “something of a commotion” with a lot of 4x4 vehicle activity in the town at the time.

Eye witnesses said that the abduction took place in the middle of Arlit, with the abductors going directly to the homes of the people taken, “as if they knew precisely where they were”. One eye witness told Reuters, “They went to their houses and grabbed them. They knew exactly where they were – it is very worrying”.

The consensus of speculation among our sources in the region is that the kidnappers are most likely to be 'local bandits', and quite probably young Tuareg former rebels of the effectively disbanded Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice (MNJ) who are now driven primarily by the need for money – “vehicles, arms, beautiful women – and adventure”. These young Tuareg are mixing and engaging with the many predominantly-Arab drug trafficking and local 'war-lord' networks that are now becoming well established in the region to the immediate south and west of the border town of Assamakka.

We have spoken with close associates of Rhissa Ag Boula, leader of the splinter Front des forces de redressement (FFR), who in 2007 had talked about launching a war on the uranium mines. We are absolutely certain that neither he nor his immediate associates are involved.

We are reliably informed that many of these 'ex-rebels' are now living in and around Tamanrasset, with the DRS fully aware of their presence. Indeed, it is suggested to us that the Algerian authorities are knowingly providing 'protection' to these bandits as part of Algeria's policy of destabilising northern Niger (and Mali).

It is believed by local sources that the motive of the abductors is unlikely to be political, in the sense of being either 'jihadist', anti-French or anti-Areva, although there has been long-term animosity towards Areva in the region. Rather, it is thought that the motive is financial, and that the abductors will try and 'sell' their captives to AQIM – most likely in Mali. This is a similar scenario to the capture of Michel Germaneau who was seized by two local 'bandits' in April in the In Abangerit area to the south-south-west of Arlit.

However, some media analysts are already speculating that the attack may, in fact, be 'political' to the extent that local militants are directly targeting France's extensive uranium mining investments in the region following President Nicolas Sarkozy's declaration of 'war' against AQIM. This was in response to AQIM's 24th July claim that it had executed Germaneau in response to France's botched raid into Mali on 22nd July, which was ostensibly to liberate the French hostage.

However, there is no evidence that Germaneau was executed, and many believe that he might have already died as a result of being denied medicinal drugs for a heart condition.

However, the main question raised by ourselves and our sources, is why these people were not living under greater security protection. Arlit has always been a dangerous mining town and over the last few years has become exceptionally hazardous. Any foreigner in the town or region is at great risk. Even local people are now declining to travel through this part of Niger.

For more news and expert analysis about Algeria please see Algeria Focus and Algeria Politics & Security.

For more news and expert analysis about the Sahara region, please see Sahara Focus.

© 2010 Menas Associates