Terror attacks continue in Kenya coastal counties

The security situation in coastal Kenya remains beyond state control. In the past two weeks, three further attacks have taken place. Attacks in Lamu and Tana River Counties, which have again been claimed by Somalia’s Al Shabaab militant Islamists, have resulted in the deaths of at least 22 people. The attacks took place on the night of Saturday 5 July.

The Tana River County attack was in the small town of Gamba, where detainees were freed from police cells and nine people were killed. At least a further 13 died at Hindi close to Mpeketoni in Lamu County. Al Shabaab claimed to have freed 40 detainees and to have killed 60 people in the process.

On the night of 11 July the village of Pandanguo was attacked by a gang of up to 60 people. Six police reservist guns were taken. Pandanguo is close to the village of Witu where, on the night of 22 June, another attack saw 11 people brutally killed.

Lamu County is fast turning into a war zone. People are fleeing the insecurity with at least 2,500 people being served by the Kenyan Red Cross in displaced people’s camps and many more relocating under their own resources. Some are reportedly questioning the government’s inept response which has allowed these attacks to continue.

The state’s response remains confused. Military spokesman Major Emmanuel Chirchir continues to contradict President Uhuru Kenyatta by pinning the blame for the attacks on Al Shabaab. Meanwhile, the Hindi and Tana River attacks have been blamed on the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC).

The MRC was founded in 1999 and seeks to establish an independent state based around Mombasa. It strongly denies the allegations. In a July 7 statement released on its Facebook page, they called on people “not to fall into the government’s trap of creating war between communities” and that “whether you like it or not, the Mombasa Republic will take its place amongst nations”. Prior to the Hindi and Gamba attacks the police reported the arrest of four alleged MRC members in Mombasa.

Mombasa itself remains tense. A Russian tourist was shot dead on Sunday 6 July while touring the UNESCO Heritage Site of Fort Jesus. It is unclear if the attack was a simple robbery or a terror attack that was targeting tourists.

On Friday 11 July the controversial businessman, Mohamed Shahid Butt, was assassinated in his car coming back from Mombasa’s Moi International airport. Butt was facing charges for inciting radicalism in the town and last appeared in court in December 2013. His shooting is suspected to have been carried out by state security officials in the Anti-Terror Police Unit. Similarly, the Al Shabaab-supporting cleric, Abubaker Shariff Ahmed, was murdered in April 2014.

The recent months have exposed the new frailties in Kenya. The traditional rivalries of the leadership of the country’s main tribes and their political groupings continue, but it is almost as a sideshow. Intensifying conflicts on the edges of the Kenyan state - in its arid north and its increasingly unstable if not ungovernable coastal region - present an increasingly acute risk to investors. The tourism sector is collapsing in the face of terror.

For more news and expert analysis about East Africa, please see East Africa Politics & Security.

© 2014 Menas Associates

IN DEPTH: Can Al-Maliki survive?

Despite his characteristic resilience, can Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki survive the unfolding crisis in Iraq? In the first week of the crisis Al-Maliki appeared lost and unable to comprehend the political ramifications of ISIS's advances and seemed to have been written off by almost every side. It therefore seemed all but inevitable that the beleaguered premier would have to concede defeat and step down.

In typical style, however, he pulled himself together quickly enough and since then has been on the offensive. Al-Maliki is fighting back hard, something that will have won him further support and respect among some Iraqi Shi’as, many of whom believe that, rather than being the root of the problem, Al-Maliki is the man to protect them from what they see as a sectarian onslaught by the Sunnis and by terrorist forces. 

One should not forget that Al-Maliki still has the support of large swathes of the Shi’a population. His State of Law Alliance took the largest number of votes in the last elections and Al-Maliki himself won 720,000 votes, the largest share of any single candidate. For all that he may be despised and accused of being authoritarian and sectarian, Al-Maliki is still the strongman of the Iraqi political scene. 

All this makes it very difficult for the other political players to force him out. This includes his Shi’a rivals. That is not to say that they haven’t been trying. The Sadrists and to a slightly lesser degree the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), are insisting on Al-Maliki’s departure, even going so far as to nominate alternative candidates for the premiership. At the end of June both blocs proposed Adel Abdulmehdi, the current deputy president, as their chosen candidate. 

Yet their efforts alone are unlikely to unseat Al-Maliki, who is not relying on either the Sadrists or ISCI for his third term. Aware that they were not going to give him a chance, he left both behind weeks ago, deciding instead to focus on forging alliances with other factions, including some Sunnis. It was through such alliances that Al-Maliki succeeded in getting the support of 165 MPs from a range of parties and currents outside the National Alliance. 

Thus for all that these big Shi’a players may be pushing for Al-Maliki’s departure they have little real influence over whether he stays or goes. 

Instead, Al-Maliki’s survival depends more on whether the State of Law Alliance and those smaller political forces that have thrown their weight behind him will continue to back him. There has been a lot of talk that key components inside the State of Law Alliance are ready to drop Al-Maliki. There have also been reports that the alliance is considering putting forward alternative candidates for the prime minister’s post. 

Among the names being circulated are Al-Maliki’s adviser Tariq Najm; deputy prime minister with responsibility for energy affairs Hussain Al-Shahrastani; deputy president Khodeir Khozei; transport minister and head of the Al-Badr Organisation, Hadi Al-Ameri; and national security adviser Faleh Al-Fayed. Notably, none of these individuals are from Al-Maliki’s Al-Dawa party, which had a weaker showing in the elections than many other components of the State of Law Alliance. 

Despite this talk, however, as yet there are no concrete signs that the alliance is about to crack or that it has any intention of withdrawing its support for Al-Maliki. This is perhaps unsurprising. State of Law is Al-Maliki’s creation and was built around him. Although there are other important figures within it, he is still the glue that holds it together and that enables it to attract so much public support. Thus abandoning Al-Maliki will not be that easy. That does not mean that they won’t do it. Much will depend on how much pressure the alliance comes under from other Shi’a parties, from other parts of the political establishment and from external forces, including Iran and the US – Washington clearly doesn’t want Al-Maliki to continue. 

As to whether those MPs from outside his alliance that Al-Maliki managed to win over will stick by him now this crisis has erupted, this is a more questionable matter. This is especially the case for those Sunni elements that Al-Maliki managed to pick off and bring over to his side, who may be persuaded to retract if they see that things are not going the prime minister’s way. Some of these elements might well falter if they see that the tide has turned against Al-Maliki and that the only way forward is to force him out of power. 

Al-Maliki’s days may well be numbered and without such support he will have no chance of holding on.

For more news and expert analysis about Iraq, please see Iraq Focus.

Egypt: Morsi trial date set

Judge Nabil Saleeb announced that Mohamed Morsi and other Brotherhood members have been charged with "inciting the killing and torture of protesters in front of the Etihadeya (presidential) palace". The incident outside the presidential palace in December was seen as a turning point in the fortunes of the former president. Those killed had been protesting at his decree extending his own powers.

The trial date has been set for 4 November. The former president has been held at a secret location since he was deposed.
 

In another move against the organisation, the ministry of social solidarity officially dissolved the Muslim Brotherhood as a non-profit organisation and ordered all of its funds and assets be put under the control of the military-appointed government.

The moves underline that the authorities currently in power have no intention of heeding the advice of others that they should seek reconciliation with the Brotherhood: this hardline approach risks storing up problems for the future.
 

The armed forces have suffered their own casualties in the past week, mainly in Sinai, at the hands of jihadist extremists. The authorities are trying to conflate the Islamists in the Sinai with the Muslim Brotherhood in the popular imagination although the two Islamist groups are ideologically very different. Six soldiers were killed in an attack by gunmen on an army patrol near Ismailia on the Suez Canal; two were killed outside the security headquarters at Al Tour, regional capital of South Sinai; and four were killed by a car bomb in Al Arish in north Sinai.
 

An RPG was also fired at the satellite ground station used by Nilesat.
 

For more news and expert analysis about Egypt, please see Egypt Politics & Security.
 

© 2013 Menas Associates

Algeria: Netherlands approves supply of military equipment

Thales Nederland has been given an export licence by the Dutch government which allows it to sell some €21 million of military equipment to Algeria. Foreign Minister Frans Timmermans confirmed the licence in a letter to the Dutch parliament. He did not name the company in the letter, although Thales has confirmed that it is the company in question.

The deal involves radar systems and so-called C3 systems (command, control and communication). This equipment will go to Algeria via China, where the Algerian navy has ordered three small frigates. The systems will be partially built into the frigates by Thales Nederland staff after which sensitive hardware and software will ultimately be installed in Algeria. This is being done to prevent Chinese companies or the Chinese government gaining access to sensitive information.

 

According to Timmermans, the licence application was checked against the EU position on weapons exports. In was not expected that the systems would infringe on the area of human rights. Timmermans also said that Algeria has a legitimate need to protect itself against terrorist action. He also virtually ruled out the chances of the sensitive relations between Algeria and Morocco escalating militarily.

 

For more news and expert analysis about Algeria, please see Algeria Focus and Algeria Politics & Security.
 

© 2013 Menas Associates