Every military mission has as its cardinal principles: defining
the objective, achieving the objective and securing an exit. No military mission
should be attempted without an exit strategy. The alternative is mission creep.
The most benign interpretation of the military's actions over
the past 18 months is that the army intervened to establish some kind of order
with the intention of withdrawing to barracks once it could hand over to a
duly-constituted civilian authority.
The army's actions over the past week put that interpretation
under considerable strain. The catalyst for the army's change of tack was the
rulings of the Supreme Constitutional Court to dissolve the Muslim
Brotherhood-dominated parliament and to permit the man that the former
regime had identified as a potential future president to stand against the
Brotherhood's candidate. Critics were quick to point out that the judges in the
court were Hosni Mubarak appointees. This is only partly true.
All were appointed under Mubarak: what institution did not have its senior
members appointed over the past 30 years that Mubarak ruled? But only the head
of the court was actually appointed by him. Furthermore, the court has a
reputation for quirkiness and had by no means always ruled in favour of the
political powers that be.
The generous interpretation of the army's actions is that
Constitutional Court rulings created a political vacuum which the army felt
bound to fill.
Few support this view. They note that whatever the army might
have said over the past 18 months, it has done little to re-assure citizens that
it understands that the rules of the political game, the relationship between
people and power, have fundamentally changed in Egypt as it has in other parts
of the Arab world. They see an army, ostrich-like, reverting to default mode. It
imposed limits on the media, sent 12,000 to military courts, was itself engaged
in abuses, killed mainly Coptic demonstrators last October and held no one to
account. The army has asked people to trust them. They have done little to earn
that trust. The political transition has been a shambles, with its stentorian
constitutional declarations and its swift appointment of an army general to
guide whoever is elected president on economic matters. It is clear that
whatever the army's original intentions, its most recent actions suggest an
organisation unwilling or unable to delegate or to trust whoever might be
elected by popular vote to rule.
Many felt that the Muslim Brotherhood was not politically
mature enough to exercise power. Others that a time in power would expose the
organisation to the compromises all those in that position have to make. But the
army's actions have now left a Muslim Brotherhood bruised and resentful that the
prize has been snatched from its grasp. The leadership has said it wants no
violent confrontation with the army. Who knows what different approach some
within the grassroots might take?
For more news and expert analysis about Egypt, please see Egypt Politics & Security.
© 2012 Menas Associates
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